Abstract: Although cultural heritage management is an inherently retrospective discipline, there is a need for strategic forward thinking. Too many valuable heritage places have been lost because they are not recognized and assessed in time. As cultural heritage management begins to examine modern structures and sites, this paper takes strategic thinking in cultural heritage management one step further and addresses the management of artifactual material created by our closest relatives, the great apes. Given the increasing understanding that chimpanzees have cultures and traditions in tool use, there is a need to recognize their heritage value in reference to human evolution.
INTRODUCTION
Heritage is a human construct. In a broad conceptual framing, cultural heritage is the result of humankind's interactions with their environment and one another. The outcome of these processes is reflected in a number of forms and is generally divided within two typologies of tangible (built environment, sites, landscapes, objects, and artifacts) and intangible cultural heritage (language, folklore, skills and customs, folklore, skills, and customs).
1 This paper is only be concerned with the tangible aspects. Heritage managers assess the values projected onto cultural heritage places (and artifacts) by the public against predetermined criteria to determine their significance. Preservation theory holds that this process enables important aspects of the past to be identified, protected, and managed for the benefit of present and future generations.
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Subjective valuation, revaluation, and ultimately prioritization occur consciously and subconsciously on a continual basis. As with all values, cultural heritage values are variable between communities as well as between socioeconomic layers within a community. Moreover, values are mutable qualities that change both in intensity of conviction and in general over time, and thereby create a semifluid state in heritage valuations. 3 
HERITAGE AND STRATEGIC FORESIGHT
The field of futures studies researches the medium-to long-term future of societies and their setting, the physical world, encompassing the mechanisms as well as the driving forces of change. Because the future is neither predictable nor predetermined, but will be influenced by the choices we make in the present, a subset of future studies is concerned with foresight. The research direction of strategic foresight, defined as "the ability to create and maintain high-quality forward views and to use the insights arising in organizationally useful ways" 4 is particularly apposite when considering the management of cultural heritage. The aim is to expand the present-day conceptual horizon by forward-projecting present observations and trends and interpreting their potential future significance.
Given that by its nature, cultural heritage management is an intensely retrospective discipline, it is not very surprising that future studies have been rare in the discipline. Even front-end technologies such as space exploration received (and in many cases still receive) mainly retrospective assessments only once it was (almost) too late. 5 True future studies are limited to discussion of the management of space technology such as orbiting satellites 6 as well as the future heritage management of sites currently in existence on other celestial bodies and out of reach of human interference. 7 All these issues, however, are still confined to the human sphere of heritage.
By starting a discussion on the future of robotic heritage and by looking at the question of how we might manage heritage sites created by future AI-imbued robots, the anthropocentric paradigm of heritage management that has recently been challenged. 8 This article is an extension of the previous assessment and concerns itself with the current and future management of heritages other than human: in particular the moveable cultural heritage of the great apes and that of robots.
This article first summarizes the nature of hominid artifacts and then expands the discussion to explore the status of pongid-generated artifacts. Conceptually, this is just a logical extension of the anthropocentric concept of heritage, as we are, after all, assessing the heritage potential of artifacts and sites created by our closest physical ancestors. The second part of the paper will consider the future heritage management of artifacts created by AI-imbued robots-whom we could, and should, consider to be our intellectual children.
Hominid archaeology is seen by most practitioners as a means of understanding who we are and how we came to be the humans we are at present. Despite often-conflicting interpretation and robust debate, archaeological excavations are considered a means to research aspects ranging from an investigation of tool production and manipulative skills 9 as well as human diet 10 to understanding cognitive evolution 11 and the development of social behavior. 12 Thus, a study of the technological development of our direct ancestral lineage is of great importance. Yet, no archaeologist would argue that the study of Neanderthal tool use should be abandoned; even though it is very persuasive from a monophyletic point of view that Neanderthals were not in our direct ancestral lineage, 13 but actually another species of Homo (neanderthalensis), moreover a species that our own species, Homo sapiens, extinguished some 30,000 years ago. The study of pongid sites and artifacts is merely an extension of the concept, looking at a genus (Pan species) that split off at the tribal level (see Figure 1) . Just as the study of the cultural heritage of our direct ancestral lineage provides insight into who we are, and just as the study of Neanderthal sites provides a means to compare ourselves with contemporaries at that time, so the study of the (cultural) heritage of chimpanzees and other great apes will provide reference points to our own self.
Furthermore, with technological innovation running at an ever-faster rate, advances in robotic development, on the technological (consider RoboCup 14 or Honda's ASIMO), the conceptual, 15 and the commercial front (NEC's PaReRo2003 16 ) are poised to revolutionize our lives. Migrating from pure mechano-logical programing to fuzzy logic, AI is trying to replicate the actions of animal brains. The Darwin robot series is a case in point. 17 Unbeknownst to most users, AI has already become quite pervasive in modern society; and robotic appliances are entering the consumer market in a series of guises.
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Thus, AI-aided applications are already all-pervasive in modern life. As these AI-imbued robots become ever more powerful (in terms of intellectual computing 
DEFINITIONS
It is understood that a recent reclassification of the human and pongid family tree based on genetics has seen a reclassification of the interrelationship (see Figure 1) , with the family Hominidae now including all great apes. Orangutans belong to the subfamily Ponginae, and all others belong to Homininae. At the tribe level, gorillas split out into Gorillini, whereas chimpanzees and humans are combined into Hominini, 21 which in turn split at the genus level. For the purposes of this article, the traditional anthropological, and effectively anthropocentric, definition model is used that places all great apes into one group, irrespective of actual monophyletic genetic closeness to humans (as shown in Figure 1 ).
For the purposes of this article, three terms need to be defined and clarified:
Pongid includes all species deemed to belong to the (former) pongid lineages as traditionally understood by anthropologists. This includes the modern species of gorilla (Gorilla gorilla; Gorilla beringei ), orangutan (Pongo abelii; Pongo pygmaeus), and chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes; Pan paniscus). Hominid includes all species deemed to belong to the hominid lineages as traditionally understood by anthropologists. This includes Homo sapiensus-as all other species of the genus Homo (i.e., Homo erectus, H. neanderthalensis, etc.) . Robotid is a term specifically coined for this paper, to sit alongside the previously mentioned terms. It extends to all variants of robots where the machines have some degree of ability for independent decision-making based on AI algorithms.
Although the evolutionary processes for all lineages are of course continuing, all available evidence for the processes for the pongid and hominid lineages rest in the past. Conversely, most evolutionary processes for robotid lineages will take place in the immediate and medium-term future.
HUMAN-CREATED ARTIFACTS
One early scientific definition for the dichotomy between animals and humans was the axiom that humans used tools, whereas animals did not. If the use of tools did not suffice as a discriminant feature, it was necessary to return to the initial dichotomy of the manufacture of tools. However, as is discussed in the following section in more detail, studies of primate behavior showed that primates, too, were able to make tools. This occurred not only in laboratory settings but also in their natural environments. Thus, the level of separation had to be raised a further notch. The manufacture of tools that defined humankind was the manufacture of tool not for simple task, but to create a tool to make a tool to carry out a task. It was this major cognitive step that defined the new boundary.
The ancestry of human tool use and manufacture has long been debated. Early hominid use of unmodified flake tools (flakes struck by percussion flaking of a pebble core), labeled the Oldowan Industrial Complex, goes back 2.5 million years ago (Ma) . 28 Based on the unmodified and accidentally modified tool use observed among chimpanzees (see the following text), it has been speculated that evidence of even earlier use may have not been recognized in the archaeological record. 29 Much of the speculation depends on the correlation of the morphological characteristics of the chimpanzees and early hominid ancestors based on brain capacity and hand anatomy.
To meet the raised cognitive test previously outlined, however, we have to wait 1.5 million years with the advent of large core tool technologies of the Acheulean Industrial Complex, where humans reduced a pebble to shape it into a tool.
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ANIMAL-CREATED ARTIFACTS
There is little need to comment in any detail on the curating of human-created artifacts. There is a plethora of publications and manuals written for museums and archives dealing with the curating of archaeological materials, artworks, textiles, photographs, paper-based items, and so forth.
Although tool use among animals has long been observed, such as the Woodpecker Finch using twigs to extract larvae from decaying wood 31 or, more recently, the use of sponges by bottle-nosed dolphins, 32 most such use is limited to objects of preexisting shape. The New Caledonian crow appears to be the only nonprimate able to select appropriate tools and if need be shape them to size. 33 However, primates have demonstrated the capability to shape a range objects to suit the task at hand: in short, to make tools.
A LINE IN THE SAND
Primate-Created Tools in Natural Environments
Tool use among great apes has been documented in captivity for gorillas, 34 common chimpanzees, 35 Bonobos, 36 and orangutans, 37 as well as other species of platyrrhine and catarrhine monkeys. 38 However, only the great apes show the ability to comprehend causal relations and thus modify tools (in experimental situations). 39 In the natural environments, these observations are confined to chimpanzees 40 and orangutans. 41 Most primate tool use has been related to gathering food. In addition, we have recent observations where a female gorilla was observed using a stick to test the depth of a pond before proceeding, while another female gorilla used a tree trunk as a makeshift bridge. 42 This shows a level of reflective thought, neither of which is associated with food procurement.
In addition, research has attributed some level of culture at least to chimpanzees inasmuch as they exhibit traditions of grooming, calling, and tool use that suggest intergenerational learning and differentiation by one group from another.
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Chimpanzees in the Taï Forest in the Ivory Coast collect stones and use them as nutcracking implements. A scatter of stone flakes is gradually formed around specified sites where unmovable anvils exist. The hammer stones were of varied raw materials, some of which were transported to the nutcracking site from source locations of up to 2 km away. Some assemblages have been excavated by archaeologists and studied for their similarities with early hominid sites. 44 The authors claim that the artifacts from the Taï Forest site "resemble some Early Stone Age industries from East Africa."
45 That has been criticized by others who claim that any modification of the stone hammers and anvils is accidental. 46 At the present state of study and observation of chimpanzee populations living in their natural environments, stone use is limited to unmodified stones. Stone flaking, a skill that could be taught to chimpanzees in captivity (see the following text), does not seem to occur in the natural world.
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Primate-Created Tools in Human-Controlled Environments
The debate on human consciousness and learning has also created a debate that has looked at the ability of great apes to learn and perform cognitive tasks under controlled laboratory conditions. A number of pongids in captivity have been taught how to use and flake stone tools.
The pioneering study was carried out in 1971 by Richard Wright who demonstrated to a 5 1 2 _ -year-old captive male orangutan, Abang, how to use a stone tool to cut a string that kept shut a box with food. The orangutan could copy the action after 9 demonstrations and 12 trial event exposures. Subsequent trial events all resulted in success. In the continuation of the experiment, Wright demonstrated to the orangutan how to strike a stone flake off a core. After six demonstrations and seven trial events the orangutan succeeded in striking a chip off the core, which he repeated in the following attempt. After another demonstration, the orang-utan managed to copy that skill and strike off flakes in the following three trial events. After the last attempt Abang proceeded to use the flake to open the box. Filming of the orangutan 10 days after the last event showed that he was able to strike flakes and cut the string of his own accord. 48 The study carried was pioneering in its scope, but in the final summation it only demonstrated that a orangutan had the imitative capacity to learn to make tools and put them to a (predefined) use. The study, as Wright himself counselled, was not designed to test intuitive problem solving.
The experimental setup was repeated by Nick Toth and Kathy Schick starting in 1991; they carried out a series of experiments with a 9-year-old Bonobo (Pan paniscus), Kanzi. Striking flakes off a core and using them to cut string and keep shut a food reward box was briefly demonstrated. Kanzi soon acquired the skill to carry out the task, continually improving his abilities to flake. In view of the long-term experiment, Toth and Schick demonstrated that the Bonobo carried out an innovation. Kanzi found that throwing the hammer stone at the core provided better results, possibly because of the larger force exerted in that way. The longitudinal study, to which another Bonobo has been added, has yielded a large number of tools that could be analyzed in a fashion akin to human stone tools.
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The important observation made by the researchers was that Kanzi was able, over 3 years of observation, to improve his skill at producing flakes, 50 indicating that Bonobos are capable of improving of skills through practice.
Curating Animal-Created Artifacts
Commencing with the curiosity cabinets of the sixteenth century, there is a long tradition in collecting human artifacts with a range of institutions worldwide. Common to all major museums and archives is that they have a collections policy grounded in the ethical management and curating items long term to ensure that they do not deteriorate. 51 These museums tend to divide along traditional lines of scientific enquiry into the human and the natural animate and inanimate world. The artifacts of human endeavor are collected in museums of archaeology, ethnography, art, and folklore, as well as in archives and libraries. The animal world is collected in live form in zoos as well as in natural history museums. Do the items derived from the studies of great ape tool use belong into the realm of natural history museums, or should they be part of an archaeological/ anthropological collection? And what about the material culture created by animals in captivity? Who collects that? And what kind of collections policy should be applied?
The excavation at the Tai Forest sites by Mercader and coworkers 52 has created congruence between primatological behavioral research on one hand and paleoanthropological and archaeological research on the other. The traditionally anthropocentric discipline of archaeology has been widened to consider pongid sites.
A LINE IN THE SAND
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The findings of the research are significant and the excavated material culture of the chimpanzee population must be curated in an ethically acceptable way so future generations have the opportunity to compare. This is even more imperative considering that the chimpanzee group is capable of learning and that, at some point in time, technological change may in fact occur.
At present the research into chimpanzee generated sites is limited; the full variation within the tool manufacturing process is unknown, neither is there a full understanding of how common such sites are. Both are of requirements for the assessment of these within the concept of cultural heritage management. This then raises the question of how the material, both from the excavations and experiments previously mentioned, is being curated. The artifacts derived from these excavations at the Tai Forest sites are curated at the researcher's academic institution. The artifacts created by the orangutan Abang in Wright's pioneering study of 1971 are still in the researcher's possession 53 and thus subject to the vagaries of domestic house fires and the like. There are no formal plans for where these artifacts will be curated in the long term, but a future holding in public hand can be anticipated. The artifacts created by the Bonobo Kanzi as part the Toth and Schick study are held at the Centre for Research into the Anthropological Foundations of Technology, at Indiana University.
The underlying questions about how these artifacts should be valued, and how these values should be assessed, are addressed later in the article. 59 It can be used to equip machines with independent decision-making capabilities based on predefined grammatical (rather than fixed rule) sets, obviating the need for the presence of humans. Not surprisingly, military applications have been at the forefront: Uncrewed combat vehicles 60 and surveillance planes have been developed and deployed 61 and are continually being given increased capabilities.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE-CREATED ARTIFACTS
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At the same time, new research is looking at the concept of genetic algorithms 63 and how they can be successfully employed to improve the performance of robots. 64 Parallel research considers the ability of (at present simple) robots to observe the behavior of other robots and imitate it based on a stored set of possible outcomes.
65 As these developments continue with ever-increasing pace, there can be little doubt that before long a robot will create the first artifact. That artifact will have been derived purely from the evolutionary thought processes of the robot rather than from human-designed preconditions to which the robot/genetic algorithm developed a solution.
If we ignore the emergence of robot-generated sites from the consideration of this paper, 66 at present the only artifacts generated by robots are confined to digital constructs in the realm of genetic algorithms and artificial (digital) life forms.
Issues Of Curating
At present, no robots are included in national lists of cultural heritage items protected from export or destruction. Some museums (Smithsonian, Massachusetts Institute of Technology [MIT] ) are collecting items of the information age, but none of this has been particularly systematic.
Most research relating to robotics and AI is carried out by academics in a wide range of universities as well as by scientists in commercial settings (such as Sony, NEC, or Honda). The commercial realities of the modern world, with the development of intellectual property in inventions, mean that many of the intermediate stages will be held in-house without formal collection and curating processes, apart from standard academic or laboratory diligence. Even where universities have set up museums of technology (such as MIT), there is no guarantee that the significant items created by university staff will eventually be handed to the museum for curating. 69 There are also some web archives that focus on historic software.
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CULTURE: A WORKABLE DICHOTOMY?
Having considered aspects of material culture of hominid, pongid, and robotid design and some issues related to curating, it is now time to tie the discussion back to the question of cultural heritage management. Before considering the question of how the cultural heritage values of these three sets of artifacts are assessed (see the following text) it is necessary to establish whether there is a fundamental difference between these three typologies of artifacts, and if so, where the dichotomous line can be placed. Since heritage management and evaluation, as well as the whole concept of ethics per se is a human construct, it is inevitable that the considerations presented later in the article will be rooted in human constructs themselves. One of the major concepts that influences the discussion is that of culture.
As tool use, and later tool manufacture became untenable as a dichotomy between humans and the great apes (and other animals), anthropologists have tended to position the key dichotomy at the concept of 'culture.' Culture has been re-A LINE IN THE SAND garded as an eminently human trait based on the "cognitive and learning mechanisms by means of which such information is transmitted."
71 Definitions of human culture vary, subjectively based on the ideological standpoint of the interpreter. UNESCO 72 holds that "culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs," which according to Bates and Plog 73 "are transmitted from generation to generation through learning."
The definition of culture among ecologists is based on the assumption that any animal behavior that is not uniform across all members of the species but varies in circumscribed geographic areas and that cannot be explained either environmentally or genetically, must be learned behavior transmitted within a subpopulation.
74 "Culture is information or behavior acquired from conspecifics through some form of social learning." 75 In that view, humans are merely other animals, where the intergenerational learning is more complex. Thus, the matrilineal transmission of the use of sponges to protect the vulnerable nose of bottlenose dolphins has been described as cultural transmission 76 and Rendell and Whitehead 77 in their review of cultural transmission among cetaceans analyzed a wide range of definitions of culture as used in the ecological literature.
Culture Among the Great Apes
Setting aside the literature on culture and dialect among song birds, as well as the growing number of studies on cetaceans, the main body of work on animal 'culture' looked at the great apes-mainly because of their evolutionary proximity to humans. The key difference between the great apes and other animals also rests in the fact that primates are the only animals other than humans where multiple behavioral elements have been observed. Several studies have been carried out to investigate the nature of culture among chimpanzees 78 and orangutan. 79 Studies of behavior and tool use among chimpanzees have shown that tool-use behavior is organized in traditions or cultures. 80 A good example is nutcracking that is practiced among some groups but not among others, even though the latter are only 30 km away.
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The study of the captive Bonobo Kanzi showed that an individual Bonobo could learn experientially, innovate on techniques, and improve his skills to create useful flakes. 82 The key question is whether such skills would be passed on, intra-and intergenerationally and if so, how.
Observations among chimpanzee populations have shown that intergenerational transmission of skills and cultural practices occurs but also that some tool use is invented yet dies out again without being adopted by most of the group. For this, group dynamics and the social standing of the inventor were held responsible. The key difference rests in the fact that among human innovators the role of (formalized) teachers able to vocalize instructions must be considered. This is ab-250 DIRK H. R. SPENNEMANN sent in the chimpanzee world where imitators may exist but where the imitation may take on its own expressions.
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Human culture provides ample evidence of the ratchet effect, whereby the plane of knowledge and thus learning complexity is raised from generation to generation and where the next generation can critically interpret the cumulative results of the previous generations. This is largely absent among the chimpanzee populations. But as Boesch and Tomasello 84 rightfully point out, the line of evidence for the culture of chimpanzees is only very short because behavioral studies among the chimpanzee populations are only comparatively recent. Moreover, as Whiten 85 pointed out, the evidence from the early hominid sites demonstrates that the ratchet effect occurred in small increments that can only be identified in a time scale of hundreds of thousands of years.
If we accept that culture is, essentially, a process where "information or behavior is acquired from conspecifics through some form of social learning," and where this learning is reinforced through intergenerational emulation (among the great apes) and emulation and organized instruction (among humans), culture is no longer a valid measure and the dichotomy between animal and human must be placed at a different level.
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Culture Among Robots
The current discussion of culture among robots falls into three spheres: literary imagination; technological innovation; and technologically-informed conceptualization. All are relevant as they inform and influence each other.
Created in 1920 by the Czech playwright Karel Č apek for his play R.U.R. (Rosumovi Umělí Roboti [Rossum's Universal Robots]), the term robot 87 soon replaced automaton in most languages of the world. The concept was explored in a range of plays, novels, and films. Both academic and popular (science fiction) works quickly took to the term robotics, coined by Isaac Asimov in 1941 in the short story "Liar!"
88 To create some order in his imaginary world, Asimov created a series of behavioral rules. 89 Asimov's laws of robotics assume the supremacy of humans, even though in earlier films (such as Metropolis) and plays (such R.U.R.) that is not given and the view is much darker. As Bartneck 90 has shown, much of the contemporary popular perception of robots as perpetuated by the media and entertainment industry is that people assume there are two types of robots: those would want to be like humans (e.g. Bicentennial Man) and those who are evil and wish to destroy the world (e.g., the Cylons in Battlestar Galactica). There is little conceptual work in the media that future robots may in fact have their own, different priorities and, eventually, their own value sets. That robot life forms will use humans as reference points for their value constructs may well be a fallible assumption: Robots might merely regard humans as at the same level of abstraction they might A LINE IN THE SAND regard other mammals, or in fact as they might regard any other carbon-based life form.
Substantial work has been carried out on the design requirements and concepts of socially interactive robots 91 with attitudinal research on how people would respond to social robots. 92 Yet, many commercial applications still mimic human behavior as the following text from the NEC product information illustrates:
[NEC created a] Behavior model [that] designs the robot character through the design of consistent behavior patterns based on the given character. For example, a robot can be designed by specifying his "likes" and "dislikes" such as "he loves dancing but astrology" [sic] "selfish and independent," or "passive and obedient." Based on the specified interests, tastes, and characters of the robot, he evaluates each human-robot interaction, such as 'fun' or 'boring.' The collected evaluation results are used to define the next action, spontaneous behavior, and reaction to a questions by the user.
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Although there is much talk about a robot culture, exercise care to avoid confusing the concepts. The Japanese electronics companies are proponents of a robot culture conceptualized in the same way as we would talk about a good food and dining culture (i.e., still focused on the human element). 94 The construct of robot culture as posited in this article relates to the cultural construct originated by robots.
Although the current commercial work imitates selected subsets of human behavior, based on human concepts and values, little consideration has been given to the values robots themselves may hold and, ultimately, the concept of robot culture.
The prerequisites for robots to develop culture in human terms would be for them to develop independent, critical, and self-reflective thought-in essence that a robot would gain consciousness and, ideally, self-awareness. The traditional key test for AI to have come of age, has always been the Turing Test. 95 To answer the question whether machines can think, he proposed a variation of the imitation game 96 where a machine takes the place of one of the humans in the closed-room scenario. A machine is deemed capable of thought if the human interrogator is unable to correctly identify the target individual (in this case as a machine) as often as the human fails to do in the entirely human setting. 97 Often criticized as impossible and unrealistic, it is argued that the Turing Test would not measure the consciousness of a machine. 98 At present there is no acceptable test to assess whether an AI design has consciousness. Many of the chatbots, starting with ELIZA, 99 appear to mimic real conversations; but in fact they have been carefully programed to respond to human-provided cue words in such a way that humans ignore the occasional non sequitur and generally interpret the responses as they wish; and thus they continue the conversation unaware that the machine answers but does not understand. The chatbots are, by their design, incapable of cognitive learning and development.
From the perspective of cultural heritage management, it is crucial to define what the term culture should encompass. If the human concept of consciousness, is used, the development of a robot culture is a very long way off. 100 Conversely, as in the case for the great apes, to propose an acceptance that culture is essentially a process where "information or behavior is acquired from conspecifics through some form of social learning," and where this learning is reinforced through intergenerational emulation, deems the matter somewhat different.
There are already examples where robots learn from each other and optimize strategies of collaboration based on their situation. 101 The definition of culture among the great apes also assumes that these traits and skills are spatially confined to one or more groups, while at the same time some neighboring groups do not share these traits. As a corollary among the robots, a set of identically designed machines is interpreted; they carry out a series of experimental simulations as populations, where each population executes the same experiment, but where the outcomes and thus the optimization strategies differ. It is worth experimenting to see whether these strategies, without human intervention and guidance (through programing), would become habitual; and in the next level, to add new but identical machines to the mix to see whether the learning process is intergenerational. Such models have already been run successfully in the fields of genetic algorithms.
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At present there is no tangible manifestation of robot culture in the form of artifacts along those produced by the great apes either in captivity or in their natural setting. The closest such developments are the improved technological designs in the car and aircraft industry (see above).
JUDGED BY WHOSE VALUES?
Because cultural heritage and values in general are both human constructs, the values that underpin and circumscribe what people define as heritage are subjective, individual, or communal but purely human projections onto an essentially value-free animate or inanimate world. The central figure in the valuations is the individual, and the central generation is the present one.
103 So then, how should these items be valued?
As de Waal 104 pointed out, animal culture cannot be compared with human culture if the standards of human art, cuisine, science, and politics are applied. But what, he posited, if we "change perspective, and don't measure them by our standards?"
If we take the ecological definition of culture as the basis of our considerations, and thus regard human culture with its psychological complexities merely as an extremely well-developed set of cultural traits, the artifacts generated by the great apes are regarded as material culture. As such then they must be researched and evaluated to address regional and subregional variation, all of which can give A LINE IN THE SAND evidence on the development of tool traditions among the early hominids 105 and can illuminate human evolution.
When considering the values projected onto pongid, hominid and robotid artifacts we have to consider the capabilities of the creators to exert value judgements, as well as our own contemporary human values that we are projecting on the moveable cultural heritage resources.
Hominid Values
Most modern humans value the past in one form or another. We are, of course, uninformed about how the early hominids valued their artifacts once they were no longer used. Thus, the concept of hominid values must be constructed based on how we value(d) the artifacts of our more distant past. Bandi 106 explored the perceptions of the past held by European and Mediterranean cultures. He demonstrated that until the beginning of positivist thinking in the Age of Enlightenment, the past was regarded as better than the (then) present. The fall, the expulsion from paradise as expressed in Judeo-Christian religion, as well as Golden Age of Greek and Roman thought are examples. Only with Rousseau, Schiller, and Kant did the present, and by implication the future, become more positive than the past.
Although the discovery of Herculaneum and Pompeii was of significance for Renaissance art, it was only with the positivist frame of mind that humans began to seriously value the objects of their ancient past-and to collect them. 107 thus there results an established a range of institutions, administrative processes, and rules of behavior to manage these expressions of the past. 108 
Pongid Values
The excavation at the Tai Forest sites has broadened the perception of archaeology from an anthropocentric discipline. It now also encompasses the behavior and tool use of chimpanzees. Although Mercader and colleagues 109 and their commentators 110 comment on the expansion of archaeology, they consider archaeology at present as a mere method to study the site and its contents. Yet, the excavation of chimpanzee sites forms an expansion of the concept that might entail a paradigm shift in opinion.
What needs to be considered, however, is the extent of the conundrum of having to manage pongid heritage. Certainly, pongid heritage is in museum collections. Although some humans may value this heritage, it is self-evident that the pongid creators of this heritage do not value the items once they are removed from their sites to museums. Moreover, as far as can be ascertained, no studies have been carried out that consider the extent of pongid reuse of an artifact in the natural setting, or on the reuse, or habitual use, of successful flakes created by Kanzi and the second Bonobo Panbanisha.
DIRK H. R. SPENNEMANN
Robotid Values
As humanity's values change in response to the new intellectual challenges posed by the increased capabilities of AI-derived robots, it is necessary to adjust the perceptions of heritage. Ultimately, consider that the present definition of cultural heritage must be flexible enough to include the actions of human-designed, but AI thinking robots in the not-so-distant future. Until such time that self-aware robots make their own decisions on the products of their own making, custodial decisions must be made for them. Heritage managers must consider whether to stand accused by future generations that the opportunity to collect robotid artifacts and intermediate milestone artifacts slipped by.
OUTLOOK
As the article has shown, the issue of managing nonhuman cultural heritage of our close relatives among the great apes, and well as among our intellectual and technological children among the robots is quite real. By focusing on the biological concept, regarding culture as a behavior acquired from conspecifics through some from of social learning, the concept of cultural heritage management can expand from the hominid sphere to include aspects of pongid and robotid culture. Although pongids do not seem to value the cultural artifacts they have created, hominids should value them as they provide an insight into possible manifestations of their past. Although the tangible manifestation of robotid culture does not exist at present, the development of genetic algorithms with group learning ability, as well as the development of robotid technologies, suggest that this is not too far off.
The difference between pongid and robotid cultural heritage rests in the fact that robots, once self-awareness has been reached, can to develop their own value sets and thus make their own decisions regarding the management of cultural heritage. Until such time, however, hominids, as intellectual parents, must act as custodians and protect the manifestations of emergent robotic heritage.
The article has raised some serious issues relating to our construction of heritage and how that may apply to artifacts created by robots capable of (semi)independent thought through improved AI algorithms. Although some issues appear quite futuristic in concept, always remember that the technological developments are progressing at an ever-accelerating pace. The fact remains that it is only a matter of time before the question arises: What is the nature and future of the earth's robotic heritage? The implications of the matter must be seriously considered, lest by future generations accuse preceding generations of not protecting the emerging heritage when there was an opportunity. The precautionary principle should apply in this case.
Cultural heritage managers have traditionally drawn a line in the sand and confined their activities, as well as their conceptual thinking to the human-derived world. With the winds of change blowing, both in terms of behavioral research into our closest relatives among the great apes, and in terms of the increasing developments in AI and its robotic applications, that line in the sand is becoming increasingly blurred. The day will dawn when it is obliterated altogether. 86. The ability of humans to transcend their own physical needs and to express themselves in a self-reflective and self-aware way appears a logical dichotomy. Placing the dichotomy of human, and by implication, of prehuman, at a level of psychological development, determines the psychological thresholds that must be recognizable in the archaeological and paleontological record. Three main incisions that separate us from the great apes come to mind: 1) Overcoming the fear of fire, demonstrable certainly because approximately 800 ka (GorenInbar, "Evidence of Hominin Control"), but possibly as much as 1.6 Ma (Bellomo, "Methods of Determining Early Hominid Behavioral Activities; Wrangham, "The Raw and the Stolen").
2) Overcoming the fear of open water, demonstrable because approximately Ͼ800 ka by the colonisation of a Homo erectus to Flores, which was always cut off from the Sunda Shelf (cf. Bednarik, "Seafaring in the Pleistocene.").
3) An understanding of the concept of mortality and of afterlife, because approximately 90 ka as evidenced by Neanderthal burials (cf Pettitt, "The Neanderthal Dead" for review). There are some indications that caching of the dead may have occurred from 200-300 ka onwards (see Pettitt, "The Neanderthal Dead" for discussion).
87. Robot is a contraction from the Czech robota meaning drudgery or servitude; and robotnik meaning peasant or serf. Karel Č apek credited his brother, the painter Josef Č apek, with the actual creation of the word.
88. Asimov, "Liar!" 89. In his 1942 short story Runaround Asimov first explicitly introduced his three laws of robotics (Asimov, "Runaround") , to which in 1985 he added a fourth which underpins the previous three (and hence is referred to as the zeroeth law of robotics) (Asimov, Robots and Empire) . 0) A robot may not injure humanity or, through inaction, allow humanity to come to harm. 1) A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2) A robot must obey orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.
3) A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law. 
